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Abstract
This paper examines the implications of that workers may not be able
to estimate their true costs of acquiring skills. Consequently, too few
workers may acquire skills. This allows for the possibility that subsidizing
education is welfare improving. Furthermore, if the presence of skill-biased
technological shocks increase unemployment, this may explain why the
market it-self cannot respond to this by making it suﬃciently attractive
to acquire skills. Consequently, the trade-oﬀ in-between subsidizing edu-
cation and thereby reducing unemployment and optimizing welfare may
be eliminated. We analyse this issue in a simple educational model and
next in a search equilibrium model including a skill choice decision.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the focus on skill-biased technological changes potentially caus-
ing increasing unemployment for unskilled workers has increased the attention
towards education. Education is meant to be important as a cure against this,
by shifting workers into the skilled labour force. This has been used as an
argument for subsidizing education.
However, if the demand for skilled workers increases relatively to the de-
mand for unskilled workers we should observe that more workers find it prof-
itable to acquire skills. No educational policy should be needed in the long run
as the market takes care of the problem itself. This should only be the case if
positive externalities associated with skill acquisition or capital market imper-
fections exist. Several papers do not support this view. Papers by Heckman
and Klenow (1997), Krueger and Lindahl (1999), Acemoglu and Angrist (1999)
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do not find empirical evidence for the positive externalities and papers by Shea
(2000), Cameron and Taber (2000), questions the importance of capital market
imperfections. Why then subsidize education?
The novelty of the present paper is that we assume that workers may not
be able to estimate their true costs of acquiring skills. We assume that costs of
acquiring skills is related to the ability of the worker. The higher the worker
ability, the lower the costs of acquiring skills. Worker ability is observed with
an error. Consequently, skill acquisition costs are observed with an error. This
allows for the possibility that subsidizing education increases welfare even when
no capital market imperfections or externalities are present. We should here
emphasize that we do not need to assume that the error goes in one particular
direction in order to obtain the result. That is, we do not assume that everyone
underestimate their true ability levels. Furthermore, we consider the relation
between a biased estimate of ability and the relation in-between welfare and
unemployment.
There exists other papers disregarding externalities associated with educa-
tion and still obtaining a possible positive impacts from subsidizing education.
However, these papers usually consider welfare functions with redistributional
considerations. See for example, the paper by Bovenberg and Jacobs (2001)
where they include another disturbance, namely policy aiming at redistribution
which calls for education subsidies in order to motivate workers to undertake
an education. Furthermore, concerning the absence of complete rationality is
considered in Becker (1962), where he assumes randomness in individual be-
haviour and by Akerlof and Dickens (1982) where they consider the impact of
individual’s tendency to disregard past information when making their choice.
However, the present paper considers the macroeconomic impacts in a model
where workers cannot correctly estimate educational costs.
So would limited cognitive ability be an important issue to consider? Should
it have any significant impact? There is no reason to believe that there is any
change in human being’s ability to correctly estimate their educational costs.
Or is there? In case skill biased technological progress urges a larger part of
the population to acquire skills than previously, more workers may potentially
move from a diﬀerent background which may be associated with it being more
diﬃcult to correctly estimate ones true ability costs. Alternatively, technological
progress happening at a higher speed, may imply that new skills are called for
and thereby in general reduce the workers’ ability to correctly estimate the
worker’s ability to acquire the necessary training for a given work.
We propose a simple model to examine the direct welfare impacts resulting
from limited cognitive ability acknowledging the worker’s skill choice decision.
A similar simple search equilibrium model is chosen in order to show how gov-
ernment policy may be optimal in an economy with skill-biased technological
progress and educational choice but without any capital market imperfections
or educational externalities. In this model, instead, we allow for labour market
imperfections due to search frictions, in order to generate unemployment. We
show that search frictions provide an interaction between job supply and skill
level which aﬀects welfare. Hence, either this mechanism or the presence of
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limited cognitive ability, is a channel through which a subsidy can be welfare
improving.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes a two sector model
with no other imperfections than limited cognitive ability. The following section
considers welfare in this model. Section 4 provides some examples and in Section
5 a simple equilibrium model for the labour market is set up and the impact of
skill biased technological progress and subsidies are considered. Finally, section
6 concludes.
2 The Model
The economy consists of a continuum of workers normalized to one. When the
worker enters the labour market he or she decides whether to acquire skills or
to remain unskilled. The labour force is heterogenous, in the sense that some
workers are more able than others to acquire and retain skills,1 whereby obtain-
ing skills is less costly for those workers. We let a denote worker ability and
let workers be uniformly distributed between zero and one, a ∈ [0, 1]. However,
workers do not observe their true ability level.2 Instead they observe a˜ = a+ ε,
where ε is uniformly distributed, ε ∈ [−12 ,
1
2 ] and hence E (ε) = 0.
The true costs of acquiring and retaining skills are c (a), where c0 (a) < 0.
Workers observe the costs c (a˜) where these costs may be larger or smaller than
the true costs. The observed costs are important for the individual worker’s
skill choice decision and thereby the skill level in the economy. When skills are
acquired, workers learn about their true costs and hence true costs are important
for welfare. The larger the error, the larger the diﬀerence in-between the true
costs and the observed costs.
An unskilled worker has productivity yl, whereas a highly skilled worker has
productivity yh, where yh > yl. We assume that workers receive a wage equal
to their productivity. This assumption is relaxed later in the paper.
2.1 Skill Acquisition
Workers choose to acquire skills if the gain associated with this is higher than
the costs. That is, worker i acquires skills if:
yh − yl > c (a˜i) .
When considering the impact of imposing a subsidy, s, we can distinguish
in-between 3 diﬀerent cases. In case A,the condition for skill acquisition is the
following:
yh − yl > c (a˜i) .
1We assume that skilled workers keep paying the costs after they have become skilled. This
is only a simplying assumption and is not important for the results.
2This is similar to the assumption made in Gilles Saint-Paul, 2002, Cognitive ability and
Paternalism.
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Even without a subsidy worker i acquires skills. Case B reads:
yh − yl < c (a˜i) ,
yh − yl + s > c (a˜i) .
Only with a subsidy worker i acquires skills. And finally, case C :
yh − yl < c (a˜i) ,
yh − yl + s < c (a˜i) .
In the last case, the implied costs are higher than the gain from acquiring
skills and hence in case C the worker does not acquire skills. We thereby have
the non-surprising result that including the subsidy increases the number of
workers acquiring skills, that is the skill level in the economy increases.
For simplicity, we assume that educational costs are linear and given by
the function, c (a) = 1 − a. The marginal worker is just indiﬀerent in-between
acquiring skills or remaining unskilled. We therefore have the condition:
yh − yl + s = 1− a˜∗,
where a˜∗ is the estimated ability level of the marginal worker acquiring skills.
Without limited cognitive ability, workers with ability a < a∗ constitutes the
unskilled labour force and workers with ability a ≥ a∗ belong to the skilled
labour force. With limited cognitive ability, ε∗ = 1− a− (yh − yl)− s denotes
the marginal worker acquiring skills and hence the number of skilled workers isR 1
0
R 1
2
ε∗ dεda and the number of unskilled workers is derived as
R 1
0
R ε∗
− 12
dεda.
However, welfare may increase or decrease as a result of including a subsidy.
A worker who has acquired skills and observed educational costs higher than
the true ability costs, experiences skill acquisition costs higher than the gain in
productivity. Welfare is reduced for this worker. Similarly, welfare increases for
the worker who has correctly estimated or underestimated his or her ability and
thereby correctly estimated or overestimated skill acquisition costs.
3 Welfare
This section considers the marginal impact on welfare from a subsidy when
workers are subject to limited cognitive ability. For expositional reasons, the
case where workers observe their true ability level and thereby their true edu-
cational costs is first examined. Next, we examine the impact on welfare from
increasing the subsidy if ability is observed with an error.
3.1 Agents without limited ability
We first consider the case where the worker can correctly estimate his or her abil-
ity. Taking expectations we have E (a˜) = a+ E (ε) = a. Welfare is determined
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as
W (s) = (1− (yh − yl + s)) yl +
Z 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
(yh + s− (1− a)) da.
Welfare increases with the subsidy as more workers acquire skills: W 0 (s) =
(yh + s− yl) > 0. However, the subsidy has to be financed. In order to focus
on any potential ineﬃciency caused by the subsidy and not the tax system per
se, we let all workers pay a lump-sum tax. The government budget constraint
is equal toZ 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
s (1 + µ) da =
Z 1−(yh−yl+s)
0
tda+
Z 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
tda = t, (1)
where µ is administrative costs associated with the subsidy. Including financing
of the subsidy we obtain the following welfare function:
W (s) =
Z 1−(yh−yl+s)
0
(yl − t) da+
Z 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
(yh + s− (1− a)− t) da
=
Z 1−(yh−yl+s)
0
ylda+
Z 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
(yh − (1− a)) da−
Z 1
1−(yh−yl+s)
sµda.
Proposition 1 Without limited cognitive ability, the optimal subsidy is s = 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating with respect to the subsidy delivers
(yh − yl)− (yh − yl + s)− (yh − yl + 2s)µ = −s− (yh − yl + 2s)µ < 0.
Hence, a subsidy always reduces welfare.
Welfare decreases with s. Without any externalities the market provides the
best outcome. Thus, a subsidy obviously increases the skilled labour force but
welfare decreases. However, if the worker does not observe his or her true ability
level this result may not hold. We now turn to this issue.
3.2 Agents with limited cognitive ability
When the worker observes ability with an error the government budget con-
straint is modified accordingly:Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
s (1 + µ) dεda =
Z 1
0
tda = t. (2)
Welfare with limited cognitive ability reads
W (s) =
Z 1
0
Z ε∗
− 12
(yl − t) dεda+
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
(yh + s− (1− a)− t) dεda. (3)
=
Z 1
0
Z ε∗
− 12
yldεda+
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
(yh − (1− a)) dεda−
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
sµdεda,
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where ε∗ = 1 − a − (yh − yl + s) denotes the marginal worker acquiring skills.
The impact on welfare from a higher subsidy is then given by
W 0 (s) = (yh − yl − (1− a))− µ (yh − yl + 2s) = (yh − yl) (1− µ)−
1
2
− µ2s.
(4)
Hence, welfare increases if
yh − yl >
1
2
+ µ (yh − yl + 2s) . (5)
On the right hand side of equation (5) is the net gain from one more worker
acquiring skills. On the right hand side we have expected costs associated
with the marginal worker acquiring skills, which are educational costs, 12 , plus
administrative costs µ (yh − yl + 2s). The government being able to estimate
the expected costs associated with increasing the subsidy should then do so if
the expected benefits are higher than the expected costs.
Proposition 2 The optimal subsidy level so is equal to so = (yh−yl)(1−µ)−
1
2
2µ .
Proof. Let the derivativeW 0 (s), given by equation (4), equal to 0 and solve for
the optimal subsidy level so. Derive the second order condition by diﬀerentiating
W 0 (s) with respect to s and obtain W 00 (s) < 0.
The optimal subsidy increases in the productivity diﬀerence and decreases
in expected education costs and administrative costs.
4 Examples
In order to increase the transparency of the present problem we now consider
some examples. We assume there are two diﬀerent ability levels in the economy,
al and ah where ah > al. Let half of workers have ability ah and the remaining
part of the labour force have ability al. For simplicity, the administrative waste
cost are excluded and the optimal subsidy levels are therefore not considered.
4.1 Agents without limited ability
We first consider the case without limited cognitive ability. The agents correctly
estimate the educational costs which are given by low costs associated with the
high ability worker, cl = 1 − ah and high costs associated with the low ability
worker ch = 1 − al where ch > cl. Suppose ch > yh − yl > cl. Then only high
ability workers acquire skills. The welfare function reads
W =
1
2
(yl + yh − cl) > 0.
Introducing a subsidy ensuring yh + s − yl > ch, implies that all workers
acquire skills and the welfare function is modified to
W (s) =
1
2
(yh + s− ch + yh − cl)− t =
1
2
(yh − ch + yh − cl) ,
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given the government budget constraint, which is given by 12s = t. Welfare
including a a subsidy is larger than welfare without if W (s) > W if and only if
yh − yl − ch > 0.
This can never hold as ch > yh − yl. Consequently, introducing the subsidy
leads to welfare reduction.
4.2 Agents with limited cognitive ability
Let a fraction of the population observe their ability with an error, hence 12pl of
the high ability workers observe ability a˜l = ah+al2 and similarly for the fraction
1
2pl of the low ability workers. Hence, observed costs for
1
2ph and
1
2pl low ability
workers is c˜ = 1− ah+al2 . Then ch > c˜ > cl. We consider two diﬀerent examples.
4.2.1 Example one, ch > yh − yl > c˜
In the first example we have that ch > yh−yl > c˜ whereby all high ability work-
ers acquire skills as well as the 12pl low ability workers observing a higher ability
level than they actually have. The low ability workers, correctly observing their
ability, do not acquire skills as educational costs are too high. Welfare without
a subsidy then becomes:
W =
1
2
yl (1− pl) +
1
2
(yh − (1− ah)) +
1
2
pl (yh − (1− al))
=
1
2
(yl + (yh − cl) + pl (yh − yl − ch)) ,
where the last term is negative. Suppose a subsidy is introduced such that
yh + s− yl > ch, whereby everyone acquire skills. In this case welfare including
the subsidy and using the government budget restriction is:
W (s) =
1
2
(yh + s− cl + yh + s− ch)− t = yh −
1
2
cl −
1
2
ch. (6)
Introducing a subsidy increases welfare ifW (s) > W ⇔ (1− pl) (yh − yl − ch) >
0, which does not hold. It follows that welfare falls. The condition can be rewrit-
ten as
1
2
(1− pl) (yh − yl) >
1
2
(1− pl) ch,
where the left hand side is the expected marginal increase in welfare and the
right hands side is the expected marginal increase in costs.
4.2.2 Example two, c˜ > yh − yl > cl
Example two considers the case where c˜ > yh − yl > cl. Then only the fraction
1− ph of the high ability workers acquire skills. Welfare without a subsidy is
W =
1
2
(yl + phyl + (1− ph) (yh − cl)) > 0.
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Now, consider two diﬀerent subsidies. In the first case, the subsidy is set
such that ch > yh + s− yl > c˜. This implies that all but the 12 (1− pl) workers
acquire skills. Welfare yields
W (s) =
1
2
(yh + s− cl + pl (yh + s− ch) + (1− pl) yl)− s
µ
1
2
+
1
2
pl
¶
,
=
1
2
(yh − cl + pl (yh + s− yl − ch) + yl) ,
Introducing a subsidy implies a welfare improvement if W (s) > W , which
reduces to
ph (yh − yl − cl) + pl (yh − yl − ch) > 0.
Welfare increases if this condition holds. The first term is positive and the
second term is negative. If pl = ph we have 2pl (yh − yl − c˜) > 0,which is not
satisfied. Hence in order for the condition to be satisfied we need that ph > pl,
that is, more high ability types observe their true ability with an error than low
ability types. The condition may be rewritten as
1
2
(ph + pl) (yh − yl) >
1
2
phcl +
1
2
plch.
Again, the left hand side is the expected marginal increase in welfare and
the right hands side is the expected marginal increase in costs.
Consider another example where the subsidy is set such that yh + s− yl >
ch then all workers would acquire skills and welfare is given by (6). Welfare
increases with the subsidy if
yh − yl − ch + ph (yh − yl − cl) > 0.
The first term is negative and the second term is positive. Hence welfare may
decrease or increase. The higher the fraction of high ability workers observing
their true ability with an error the more likely it is that the condition is satisfied
and welfare increases. The condition can be rewritten as
¡
1
2 + ph
¢
(yh − yl) >
1
2ch +
1
2phcl.
In general, welfare increases if the expected benefits are higher than the
expected costs for the workers choosing to acquire skills given the subsidy. If
the government can perform this calculation in order to determine whether or
not to introduce a subsidy, the possibility of increasing welfare exists.
5 A model of the Labour Market
We have just seen that, even without any capital market imperfections or ed-
ucational externalities, there may a scope for subsidizing education if workers
observe their true ability with an error. What does this imply for unemploy-
ment? One argument behind subsidizing education is that skill-biased techno-
logical shocks may increase unemployment if workers do not optimally react to
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the economic changes. Consider the situation where the economy is subject to
skill-biased technological changes. A feature of a long run model should capture
that unemployment is independent of productivity. However, the argument
behind skill-biased technological progress and their impact on unemployment
does not capture this. Our model can capture this feature by noting that if
skill-biased technological changes should be a reason for high unemployment in
the last couple of decades in many OECD countries, then this implicitly as-
sumes that we have not seen skill-biased technological changes to a large extend
previously. This section considers a slightly diﬀerent labour market model in
which we are able to consider the impact of skill-biased technological progress.
Here we present a model where we have some interaction in-between labour
market tightness and the skill choice decision. We do this by proposing a model
where firms supply vacancies in an undirected way.3 Hence, the firm employs
a highly skilled worker if it is matched with one and a low skilled worker if it
meets up with such a worker. The firm pays low skilled and high skilled workers
diﬀerent wages. The matching functions is given by: x = x (u, v) , where all
workers and firm compete, that is u is the total unemployment rate and v is
the total vacancy rate. The matching function has positive first order deriva-
tives, negative second order derivatives, positive cross partial derivatives, and
is homogenous of degree one. The worker’s transition rate can be expressed as
f = xu = x (θ) , where θ is labour market tightness. The transition rate facing
firms is q = xv = x
¡
1
θ
¢
. In order to model that skill-biased technological changes
may increase unemployment, we assume that skill-biased technological changes
increase relative productivity but also increase the separation rate of the low
skilled worker.
Employed workers receive wages wj , h, l. All workers receive a lump sum
transfer, R. Let r be the discount rate and d the continuous flow into and out
of the labour force. The values of employment, Ej , j = h, l and unemployment,
Uj , j = h, l as highly educated and low skilled workers are therefore determined
by the arbitrage equations:
rEh = R+ wh − t+ λ(Uh −Eh)− dEh, (7)
rEl = R+ wl − t+ λ (p) (Ul −El)− dEl, (8)
and
rUj = R− t+ f(Ej − Uj)− dUj , j = h, l, (9)
where the separation rate for firms employing a low skilled worker is an increas-
ing function of the skill-biased productivity parameter p, λ0 (p) > 0. Further-
more we assume that λ (p) > λ captured by the specific form, λ (p) = pλ.
Sector j firms employ workers with the marginal productivity py and y. The
value of having a filled job, Jj , j = h, l solve the equations:
rJh = py − wh + λ(V − Jh)− dJh, (10)
rJl = y − wl + λ (p) (V − Jl)− dJl, (11)
3A model where firms search for workers in a direct manner is available upon request. This
gives a simple segmented model, but without any direct interaction in-between skill level and
unemployment.
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where the productivity of a high skilled workers is larger than the productivity
of a low skilled worker, p > 1. The equation determining the value of a vacancy
is
rV = q((1− a˜∗) (Jh − V ) + a˜∗ (Jl − V ))− ky − dV. (12)
At the rate (1− a˜∗) the firm obtains a skilled worker and at the rate a˜∗
the firm faces an unskilled worker. Diﬀerent valuations are then attached to
employing these workers. The term ky is vacancy costs. The firm chooses to
employ one of these workers if it meets up with either of them as the value of
a vacancy, by free entry, is equal to zero, V = 0, and wages are determined
through bargaining, as shown below.
Wages, wj , are determined by Nash Bargaining with the workers’ bargaining
power equal to 12 . The first order condition yields:
Ej − Uj = Jj − V, j = h, l. (13)
We can solve for the bargained wage by using equations (7),(8)-(13), assum-
ing free entry, V = 0 and a symmetric equilibrium. Solving, we get the following
wage rules:
wh = y
(p+ θk)
2
, wl = y
(1 + θk)
2
. (14)
Labour market tightness θ, can be derived from equations (10), (11) and
(12), using the free entry condition and the wage rule in (13):
2
k
q
=
(1− a˜∗) p
r + d+ λ
+
a˜∗
r + d+ λ (p)
− θk. (15)
Labour market tightness is a function of a˜∗ and parameters, θ (a˜∗). We
observe that general productivity, y does not appear in this equation. That
is, a general unbiased increase in productivity has no direct impact on labour
market tightness. If labour market tightness is not aﬀected, then unemployment
is unchanged. This is accordance with the usual result that unemployment is
independent of general productivity changes.
As the productivity of a low skilled worker is lower than the productivity
of a high skilled worker and the separation rate of low skilled workers is higher
than the separation rate of high skilled workers, it follows that labour market
tightness increases with the number of skilled workers. Hence, a partial equilib-
rium result is that labour market tightness falls with a˜∗. However, an increase
in p both has a positive and a negative impact on labour market tightness as a
higher p both raises the productivity of a high skilled worker and the separation
rate of a low productivity worker.
5.1 Skill Level
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain a manual
worker, they compare the value of unemployment as an educated worker to the
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value of unemployment as a manual worker. In section (2.1) we analysed the
problem in a static model. Here, we obtain the condition giving the marginal
worker’s ability level, a˜∗ = (a+ ε)∗, which makes him just indiﬀerent between
acquiring higher education and remaining an unskilled worker. We can write
the condition determining the ability level of the marginal worker as:
rUh + s− rUl = 1− a˜∗.
Using equations (7)-(9) givesµ
fwh
r + d+ λ+ f
− fwl
r + d+ λ (p) + f
¶
= 1− a˜∗ − s, (16)
Equation (16) gives a˜∗ as a function of the subsidy and productivity. Work-
ers with a˜ ≤ a˜∗, choose not to acquire education, whereas workers with a˜ > a˜∗
acquire education. Hence, a˜∗ and 1− a˜∗ resolve the uneducated and highly ed-
ucated labour forces, respectively. Using the wage equation gives the marginal
ability level as a function of labour market tightness, a˜∗ (θ) :
η (θ, p, y) = 1− a˜∗ − s, (17)
where η (θ, p, y) = 12y
³
f(θ)(p+θk)
r+d+λ+f(θ) −
f(θ)(1+θk)
r+d+λ(p)+f(θ)
´
. The partial equilibrium
results are the following. The number of workers acquiring skills are increasing
in general productivity, ∂η∂y > 0, increasing in skill-biased technological changes,
∂η
∂p > 0 and the number of workers acquiring skills increases in labour market
tightness, that is, a˜∗ is decreasing in θ,∂η∂θ > 0. Solving for ε
∗ we obtain
ε∗ = 1− a− s− η (θ, p, y) .
For r → 0 we get an educational choice equation which allows for a very
intuitive interpretation:
ehwh − elwl + s = 1− a˜∗. (18)
On the right hand side is the number of workers acquiring skills. On the left
hand side of equation (18) we have the following. The wage rate received as a
highly educated weighted by the employment rate tends to increase the number
of workers acquiring skills, whereas the opposite holds in terms of wages and
employment rate for the low skilled workers. The subsidy also rises the number
of skilled workers for given labour market tightness.
Illustrating the two curves, θ (a˜∗) , a˜∗ (θ) , in a a˜∗, θ space then delivers two
downward sloping curves. The slopes are
da˜∗
dθ
|θ(a˜∗) = −
k
³
− 2q2
∂q
∂θ + 1
´
p
r+d+λ −
1
r+d+λ(p)
= −γθ (p) < 0,
da˜∗
dθ
|a˜∗(θ) = −∂η∂θ = −γa (p) < 0.
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Which slope is the greater depends on the productivity of high productivity
workers relatively to low productivity workers. For relative low values of p the
skill acquisition curve is the steeper one. See Figure 1. The reverse holds for
high values of p. This implies the following result holds. To ensure existence of
a stable equilibrium we need that −γa (p) > −γθ (p).4 Consequently, a stable
equilibrium exists for p < pˆ where pˆ solves,−γθ (pˆ) = −γa (pˆ) .We only consider
stable equilibria, that is, we assume that p < pˆ. That is, we consider equilibria
where productivity diﬀerences in-between the two types of workers are not too
high.
– Figure 1 about here –
5.2 Unemployment
Unemployment and employment in the two sectors are determined by inflow
equal to outflow. We obtain that the unemployment rates are equal to
uh =
λ+ d
f + λ+ d
, ul =
λ (p) + d
f + λ (p) + d
. (19)
Unemployment for skilled workers is higher than unemployment for unskilled
workers as the separation rate for unskilled workers is higher than the separa-
tion rate for skilled workers, λ (p) > λ, and the workers’ transition rates are
equivalent. Total unemployment is given as
u =
Z 1
0
Z ε∗
− 12
uldεda+
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
uhdεda = ul + (η (θ, p, y) + s) (uh − ul) . (20)
5.3 Welfare
The social welfare function is the sum of utilities deducted educational costs:
W =
Z 1
0
Z ε∗
− 12
W˜ldεda+
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
³
W˜h + s
´
dεda−
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
(1− a) dεda,
where W˜j = ujrUj + (1− uj) rEj + njrJj + vjrVj , j = h, l.
By making use of the asset equations for workers and firms in the two sec-
tors, imposing the flow equilibrium conditions as well as the government budget
restriction which is given by equation (2) and considering the case of no dis-
counting, i.e., r → 0, the welfare function simplifies to:
W (s) =
Z 1
0
Z ε∗
− 12
Wldεda+
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
Whdεda−
Z 1
0
Z 1
2
ε∗
(1− a+ sµ) dεda, (21)
4The slope γθ (p) tends towards a fixed number for θ→ 0 and θ→∞ whereas γa (p) tends
towards ∞ for θ→ 0 and γa (p)→ 0 for θ→∞.
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where
Wh = ((1− uh) p− vk) y = eh
1
2
(p+ θk) y = ehwh,
Wl = ((1− ul)− vk) y = el
1
2
(1 + θk) y = elwl.
High productivity increases welfare whereas vacancy costs and educational
costs reduce welfare. Another interpretation is that welfare increases with em-
ployment and wages, but falls with educational costs.
5.4 Skill-biased technological changes
Skill-biased technological changes in the form of a higher p tend to increase
labour market tightness due to the higher expected productivity. However, the
implication of the a higher separation rate for unskilled workers is a reduction
in labour market tightness. We have the following result:
Proposition 3 Skill-biased technological progress increases the number of skilled
workers, da˜
∗
dp < 0 and labour market tightness,
dθ
dp > 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating equation (15) and (17) with respect to p gives
dθ
dp
=
−
³
p
r+d+λ −
1
r+d+λ(p)
´
∂η
∂p −
1−a˜∗
r+d+λ
D
> 0
da˜∗
dp
=
³
−2 kq2
∂q
∂θ + k
´
∂η
∂p +
∂η
∂θ
1−a˜∗
r+d+λ
D
< 0,
where D =
³
p
r+d+λ −
1
r+d+λ(p)
´
(γa (p)− γθ (p)) < 0.
The impact on labour market tightness resulting from higher productivity is
larger than the negative eﬀect from the separation rate causing labour market
to increase. The increase in labour market tightness improves relative employ-
ment perspectives for skilled workers and thereby the number of skilled workers
increases. More skilled workers increase labour market tightness further due to
their relative higher productivity. This causes another increase in the number
of skilled workers. Given stability, the impact dampens until a new equilibrium
is reached.
By inspection of equation (14), we note that the increase in labour market
tightness increases wages for both high skilled and low skilled workers as the
workers’ transition rate increases which improve workers’ bargaining position.
This, in turn, tends to reduce wage dispersion as the impact on high skilled
worker wages is smaller than the impact on low skilled worker wages as the
former wages are the higher. In addition, there is a direct positive impact on
high skilled workers’ wages, the first term in the numerator of equation (22),
increasing wage dispersion. The total impact is ambiguous.
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Proposition 4 The impact on wage dispersion, wD = wh−wlwl , from skill-biased
technological progress is ambiguous.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating wage dispersion with respect to p gives
dwD
dp
=
1 + θk − (p− 1) ∂θ∂pk
(1 + θk)2
, (22)
which has ambiguous sign.
If skill-biased technological changes increases unemployment, the reason is
that the unemployment rate for low skilled workers increases. Unemployment
rates are aﬀected in the following way:
Proposition 5 Skill-biased technological progress decrease the unemployment
rate for high skilled workers and increase the unemployment for low skilled work-
ers if the elasticity of the separation rate of low skilled workers with respect to
p, 1, is larger than the elasticity of the transition rate with respect to p, pf(θ)
∂f
∂p .
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the unemployment rates, (19), with respect to p gives
∂uh
∂p
= −
λ∂f∂θ
∂θ
∂p
(f + λ)2
< 0,
∂ul
∂p
=
∂λ(p)
∂p f (θ)− λ (p)
∂f
∂θ
∂θ
∂p
(f + λ (p))2
=
ul
p
f (θ)
1− pf(θ)
∂f
∂θ
∂θ
∂p
(f + λ (p))
,
where, for λ (p) = λp, pλ(p)
∂λ(p)
∂p = 1, the sign of
∂ul
∂p is positive if 1−
p
f(θ)
∂f
∂p > 0.
Unemployment facing high skilled workers unambiguously falls as a conse-
quence of a higher labour market tightness. Hence, in terms of employment
opportunities skilled workers are better oﬀ.
Technological progress has a positive impact on low skilled unemployment
as more low skilled workers become redundant. However, technological progress
also raises the workers’ transition rate through the increase in labour market
tightness. The general impact on unemployment is, in general, indeterminate.
In addition, the impact on total unemployment is ambiguous as the direct re-
duction in high skilled unemployment and the reallocation of workers from the
low skilled to the high skilled labour force both tend to reduce unemployment,
whereas the potential increase in unemployment facing low skilled workers has
a positive impact on unemployment.
Proposition 6 The impact of skill-biased technological progress on total unem-
ployment is ambiguous.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating unemployment with respect to p gives
∂uTOT
∂p
=
∂ul
∂p
+ (η (θ, p, y) + s)
µ
∂uh
∂p
− ∂ul
∂p
¶
+
dη (θ, p, y)
dp
(uh − ul) ,
=
∂ul
∂p
a˜∗ + (1− a˜∗) ∂uh
∂p
+
∂a˜∗
∂p
(uh − ul) ,
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where we have used equation (17). The first term has ambiguous sign, the
second and last term are negative as uh < ul.
On the one hand, in case unemployment for low skilled workers increases,
this tends to increase total unemployment. On the other hand, the decrease
in high skilled unemployment and the reallocation of workers towards the high
skilled labour force, have a negative impact on unemployment. If skill-biased
technological shocks causes unemployment to increases, there may be scope for
subsidizing education. However, this may only be the case if limited cognitive
ability has a certain importance. We turn to this issue in the following section.
5.5 The impact of a higher subsidy
In this section we consider the impact of an educational subsidy on labour
market tightness, skill level, wage dispersion, unemployment and welfare. First
we examine how labour market tightness and the skill level are aﬀected and
obtain the result:
Proposition 7 An increase in the subsidy increases labour market tightness
and the number of skilled workers.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the system of equations θ (a˜∗) , a˜∗ (θ) and s with respect
to θ, a˜∗ and s to obtain:
∂θ
∂s
= −
p
r+d+λ −
1
r+d+λ(p)
D
> 0,
∂a˜∗
∂s
=
−2 kq2
∂q
∂θ + k
D
< 0.
This policy experiment is illustrated in figure 2. A higher subsidy increases
the skill level for given labour market tightness, that is, the curve representing a˜∗
as a function of labour market tightness shifts inwards. Labour market tightness
increases, due to the better estimated perspectives of opening a vacancy. This,
in turn, increases the skill level further and thereby labour market tightness.
The impacts become smaller and smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
— Figure 2 about here –
Both wages increase with the subsidy as labour market tightness increases,
∂wh
∂s =
∂wl
∂s =
1
2yk
∂θ
∂s > 0. Concerning wage dispersion the result is clear cut.
Proposition 8 An increase in the subsidy reduces wages dispersion, ∂wD∂s < 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating wage dispersion with respect to s gives
∂wD
∂s
= −
(p− 1) k ∂θ∂s
(1 + θk)2
< 0.
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The increase in labour market tightness increases wages for both high skilled
and low skilled workers as the workers’ transition rate increases which improve
their bargaining position. This causes a reduction in wage dispersion as the
impact on high skilled worker wages is smaller than the impact on low skilled
worker wages as the former wages are the higher. The reduced wage dispersion,
implying relatively better perspectives in the unskilled sector, therefore modify
the positive impact on the skill level.
In terms of the direct impact on employment and thereby unemployment,
both unemployment rates fall following the increase in labour market tightness,
∂ul
∂θ
∂θ
∂s < 0,
∂uh
∂θ
∂θ
∂s < 0. It follows that employment rates increase for the two
groups of workers. The impact on high skilled unemployment is larger than
the impact on unemployment facing low skilled workers. Thereby dispersion,
in terms of unemployment rates, falls. Considering total unemployment, the
impact on unemployment from the subsidy is negative.
Proposition 9 Unemployment decreases with the subsidy,∂uTOT∂s < 0.
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the unemployment equation (20) gives
∂uTOT
∂s
=
µ
∂ul
∂θ
a˜∗ + (1− a˜∗) ∂uh
∂θ
¶
∂θ
∂s
− ∂a˜
∗
∂s
(uh − ul) < 0,
which is negative as ∂θ∂s > 0 and uh < ul.
As the subsidy implies that more workers acquire skills and as the unemploy-
ment rate for skilled workers is lower than unemployment facing unskilled work-
ers, unemployment falls. Acknowledging that workers perceive limited cognitive
ability with respect to educational costs would not aﬀect the policy conclusions
in terms of unemployment reductions. However, without limited cognitive abil-
ity, there may be a trade-oﬀ in-between reducing unemployment and increasing
welfare as workers have responded optimally and correctly to the productiv-
ity shock. In order to see this we first consider the impact on welfare without
limited cognitive ability.
In this case, welfare reads
W =
Z a∗
0
Wlda+
Z 1
a∗
Whda−
Z 1
a∗
sµda−
Z 1
a∗
(1− a) da,
and the number of skilled workers is determined by 1− a∗ =Wh −Wl + s.
The impact on welfare from a higher subsidy is given by
∂W
∂s
=
∂W
∂a∗
|s ∂a
∗
∂s
+
∂W
∂s
|a∗
where
∂W
∂a∗
|s ∂a
∗
∂s
= − (Wh −Wl − sµ− (1− a∗))
∂a∗
∂s
= sµ
∂a∗
∂s
< 0,
∂W
∂s
|a∗ = ∂Wl∂s +
µ
∂Wh
∂s
− ∂Wl
∂s
¶
(Wh −Wl − sµ) .
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The impact on welfare through more workers acquiring skills, ∂W∂a∗ |s ∂a
∗
∂s , is
negative, as this number is optimally determined through individual skill acqui-
sition and the only impact is therefore the negative eﬀect through administrative
costs. The direct impact on welfare, ∂W∂s |a∗ is positive given the suﬃcient con-
dition, Wh−Wl− sµ > 0, as a higher subsidy causes employment and wages to
increase, and the total impact is the higher for highly educated workers than for
low skilled workers, ∂Wh∂s −
∂Wl
∂s > 0. The total impact on welfare is positive if
∂W
∂s |a∗ is positive and larger than the absolute value of ∂W∂a∗ |s ∂a
∗
∂s . Hence, without
limited cognitive ability, welfare may increase with the subsidy due to labour
market imperfections providing an additional impact on the economy through
relatively more vacancies supplied and associated with this, a higher skill level.
With limited cognitive ability, then a subsidy may be welfare improving even
if the impact on welfare through labour market imperfections is insignificant.
The impact on welfare resulting from a higher subsidy is:
∂W
∂s
=
∂W
∂ε∗
|s dε
∗
ds
+
∂W
∂s
|ε∗
where
∂W
∂ε∗
|s dε
∗
ds
=
µ
η0 −
1
2
− sµ1
2
¶µ
−dε
∗
ds
¶
,
∂W
∂s
|ε∗ =
Z 1
0
dWl
ds
µ
ε∗ +
1
2
¶
da+
Z 1
0
dWh
ds
µ
1
2
− ε∗
¶
da−
Z 1
0
dsµ
µ
1
2
− ε∗
¶
da,
where η0 = η for r = 0, that is η0 = ehwh − elwl and −dε
∗
ds = 1 +
∂η0
∂s =
1 + ∂Wh−∂Wl∂s > 0. The first three terms, inside the first parentheses capture
that the subsidy increase the skill level,
³
−dε∗ds
´
> 0 which has a direct positive
impact on welfare as employment perspectives in the highly educated sector,
ehwh are higher than in the unskilled sector, elwl, that is, η0 > 0. However,
more skilled workers reduce welfare, due to the implied educational costs, 12 , and
administrative costs, sµ12 . As in the simple model presented in the first sections
of the paper, this has a positive impact on welfare, that is ∂W∂ε∗ |s dε
∗
ds > 0, given
the net gain from more workers acquiring skills is higher than the expected costs
associated with the marginal worker acquiring skills, plus administrative costs.
The two following terms capture that welfare, both for low educated workers
and highly educated, increase, dWlds > 0 and
dWh
ds > 0, and the relative impor-
tance of these increases depends on how many low skilled and highly educated
workers there are in the economy. Finally, the last term is the reduction in wel-
fare, due to administrative costs, corresponding to all highly educated workers,
as they all receive the subsidy.
The following two propositions summarize the result.
Proposition 10 With limited cognitive ability an optimal subsidy, so > 0 ex-
ists.
Proof. The optimal subsidy, so > 0, solves W 0 (so) = 0 assuming the second
order condition is fulfilled.
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If skill-biased technological progress provide an increase in unemployment,
then the existence of limited cognitive ability eliminates the trade-oﬀ in-between
reducing unemployment and increasing welfare.
Proposition 11 With limited cognitive ability, the trade-oﬀ in-between reduc-
ing unemployment, reducing wage dispersion and increasing welfare does not
exist for s ≤ so.
The result follows immediately from proposition (10),(8), (7) and (9).
6 Conclusion
This paper has focused on the case where workers may not correctly observe
their own ability levels, which we denoted limited cognitive ability. Workers are
therefore not able to correctly estimate their true educational costs providing
an ineﬃcient outcome in terms of skill level in the economy. A subsidy therefore
potentially increases welfare even without any capital market imperfections or
educational externalities. It is worth noting that we do not need to assume that
individuals are underestimating their ability levels, in order obtain this result.
We then considered this feature of limited cognitive ability in relation to skill-
biased technological progress. In case skill-biased technological progress result
in higher unemployment, at least for the low skilled group of workers, absence of
capital market imperfections or educational externalities leaves not immediately
any room for policy measures if eﬃciency should be retained. Each individual
worker should, at least, in the medium run, respond to the changed economic
environment acquiring skills if that is profitable. If it is not profitable for each
individual worker, welfare is reduced if workers are provided with an educational
subsidy. Hence, there may exist a trade-oﬀ between reducing unemployment and
increasing welfare.
However, if due to labour market imperfections or if workers are subject to
limited cognitive ability, it may the case that the trade-oﬀ in-between reducing
unemployment and increasing welfare cease to exist. A subsidy serves to shift
workers into the skilled labour force, and may be welfare improving if with
limited cognitive ability the market solution implies that too few workers acquire
skills. Consequently a nontrivial optimal subsidy level exists.
It remains to be consolidated that limited cognitive ability is important.
The present paper shows that limited cognitive ability indeed is a potential ex-
planation that Europe for decades still experiences high rates of unemployment
among low skilled workers even though capital market imperfections may be
absent, which otherwise would be an explanation why workers do not respond
to skill-biased productivity shocks. Experimental studies could shed light on
the correlation in-between a person’s own perception on his or her abilities and
the persons true abilities. Future work is here called for.
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